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I. INTRODUCTION 
Federal maritime policy has evolved as an accumulation of legislative statutes and 
administrative programs that have been tailored by the U.S. government in an attempt to 
respond to specific global and domestic issues and trends within the maritime industry.  
The Shipping Act of 1916, which was passed in anticipation of entry into World War I, 
opened an era in which the federal government funded, regulated, and dominated the U.S. 
merchant marine.  The Merchant Marine Act of 1920 defined the maritime goals of the 
U.S.: “It is hereby declared the policy of the United States to do whatever may be 
necessary to develop and encourage the maintenance of a merchant marine … sufficient 
to carry the greater portion of its commerce and serve as a naval or military auxiliary in 
time of war or national emergency, ultimately to be owned by citizens of the United 
States.”  Section 27 of this Act, known as the Jones Act, is best known for strengthening 
the existing domestic waterborne coastal shipping laws.   
The U.S. Maritime Commission was established as an independent agency by the 
passage of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, to further develop and maintain a merchant 
marine for the promotion of U.S. commerce and defense.  The Commission was 
authorized to regulate U.S. ocean commerce, supervise freight and terminal facilities, and 
administer government funds to construct and operate commercial ships.  Since the 
conception of the U.S. Maritime Commission, the government has maintained an active 
interest and involvement in maintaining a U.S.-flag merchant marine fleet.  This rationale 
for supporting the U.S. maritime industry continues to this day.   
The tenets of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 have evolved into the 
cornerstones of U.S. maritime policy.  The Operating Differential Subsidy (ODS) was the 
single most significant feature of this Act in recognizing and offsetting the higher costs 
associated with operating ships under a U.S. flag. 
The Maritime Security Act of 1996 (MSA) significantly amended the Merchant 
Marine Act of 1936 in an attempt to revitalize the U.S.-flag merchant marine fleet.  It 
mandated the Secretary of Transportation to “establish a fleet of active, military useful, 
privately-owned vessels to meet national defense and other security requirements and 
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maintain a U.S. presence in international community shipping.” (Public Law 104-239)  
The cornerstone of the MSA is the Maritime Security Program (MSP).  The MSP was 
designed and implemented to assure the viability of a U.S.-flag merchant marine fleet 
capable of maintaining a role in international commercial shipping and meeting the sealift 
needs of the United States during national emergencies.  The MSP, a ten-year program 
scheduled to expire in 2005, has largely replaced the ODS program which compensated 
U.S. carriers on a reimbursable basis for the higher costs of operating ships under the 
U.S. flag as compared to those of foreign-flag competitors.  Congress established MSP 
funding levels at fixed amounts well below that of the ODS.  
A. OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this thesis is to analyze the impact and effectiveness of the MSA 
in revitalizing the U.S.-flag merchant marine fleet.  Additionally, the development of 
U.S. maritime policy is examined in order to understand the events and concerns behind 
the government’s current policy of actively maintaining a merchant marine fleet and the 
use of subsidies.  Contemporary U.S. maritime policy is rooted in laws and policies 
enacted in the early 1900s.  Beginning in the early 1900s, U.S. maritime policy has been, 
in part, designed to dampen the boom-bust cycles that have characterized the history of 
the U.S. maritime industry.  The primary means by which the U.S. influences its 
domestic maritime industry is through legislation.  The purpose of this research is to 
provide a comprehensive examination to determine if current maritime legislation and 
policy is an effective tool in revitalizing the U.S.-flag merchant marine fleet.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Primary Question: What has been the impact of the passage of the MSA on the 
U.S.-Flag merchant marine fleet? 
Supporting Question 1:  What is the ability of the MSA to structure 
implementation and what are the non-statutory variables affecting implementation? 
Supporting Question 2:  What are the policy outputs of the MSA and their 
resulting impacts?   
Supporting Question 3: What other vessel operating assistance programs and 
maritime policies, besides providing a subsidy, are available to U.S. policy makers in 
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creating an environment conducive to sustaining a viable U.S.-flagged merchant marine 
fleet? 
Supporting Question 4: Should the MSA be extended beyond 2005?  If so, what 
changes, if any, would be appropriate?  
C. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
The research will analyze the impact and effectiveness of the MSA, changes in 
the composition of the U.S.-flag merchant marine fleet since its passage, and current 
Maritime Administration policies and initiatives to determine if the goals and intents of 
the Act are being met. 
The nation’s maritime industry composes many elements and various interest 
groups, complicating the issue of policy reform.  Throughout U.S. history, the federal 
government has attempted to tailor its maritime policy to meet the needs and concerns of 
customer shippers, domestic vessel operators, international vessel operators, subsidized 
and unsubsidized carriers, shipyards, labor organizations, and national security interests.  
To analyze and evaluate the impact of the MSA on the U.S.-flag merchant marine fleet, 
the subject of maritime policy in this thesis will focus on international carriers and vessel 
operating assistance programs.  The use of commercial sealift for sustaining military 
operations is also addressed as it relates to the U.S.-flag merchant marine fleet.  It does 
not discuss operating agreements with NATO countries and Effective U.S. Controlled 
(EUSC) vessels.    
D. METHODOLOGY 
The thesis will examine the impact and effectiveness of the MSA, focusing on the 
statute’s ability to structure implementation and the non-statutory variables affecting 
implementation.  The independent variable then, is the MSA.  Dependent variables 
include the policy outputs and their resulting impacts.  An exploratory conceptual 
framework for analysis by Paul A. Sabatier and Daniel Mazmanian is used to evaluate the 
implementation of policy. (Sabatier 1995)  Data for the study were obtained through a 
comprehensive review of congressional hearings and reports, Maritime Administration 
publications, GAO reports, government publications, books, maritime periodicals, 




Chapter II, “U.S. Maritime Policy Leading to the Passage of the Maritime 
Security Act of 1996,” provides a historical background of government policy and 
involvement in the maritime industry leading to the passage of the MSA.    
Chapter III, “Conditions Influencing Policy Implementation,” examines the 
statute’s ability to structure implementation and the non-statutory variables affecting 
implementation.  It then details the various policy elements that emerged as a result of its 
passage. 
Chapter IV, “Tractability and Implementation Stages,” evaluates the resulting 
impacts of the MSA policy elements on the U.S.-flag merchant marine fleet. 
Chapter V, “Summary and Conclusions,” summarizes the impact and 
effectiveness of the MSA and the analysis provided in the previous chapters.  Follow-on 
proposals for the MSA are addressed along with areas for further research. 
F. EXPECTED BENEFITS OF THIS THESIS 
This thesis is intended to show the impact of current maritime legislation and 
policy on the U.S.-flag merchant marine fleet.  The critical review of the Maritime 
Security Act of 1996 will provide maritime policy personnel and Congress with relevant 




II. U.S. MARITIME POLICY LEADING TO THE PASSAGE OF 
THE MARITIME SECURITY ACT OF 1996 
A. INTRODUCTION   
The American shipping and shipbuilding industries trace their roots to the very 
inception of the U.S., having played key roles in transforming a fledgling nation into a 
military and economic superpower.  Federal maritime policy has evolved as an 
accumulation of statutes and administrative programs that have been tailored by the 
United States government in an attempt to respond to specific global and domestic issues 
and trends impacting the maritime industry.   
The Department of Transportation (DOT), typically acting through its Maritime 
Administration (MARAD), is the implementing agency for legislative programs that 
affect the movement of people and cargo in domestic and international waterborne 
commerce to promote America’s growth and international competitiveness. 
B. ORIGINS OF A MARITIME POLICY 
The onset of World War I in Europe threw international trade into turmoil.  At the 
time, 92 percent of American trade was carried by foreign ships, mainly British (58 
percent) and a combination of German and Austrian (15 percent). (De La Pedraja 1992, 
p. 47)  Much of the country’s agricultural and industrial output was produced for foreign 
markets.  Foreign shipping provided the nation’s primary links with these customers.  An 
elongated era of peace and prosperity had falsely convinced the nation that there would 
always be sufficient ships to carry its products and goods.  The warning that Thomas 
Jefferson had conveyed to Congress over a century earlier in 1793, when serving as the 
first Secretary of State, had been either forgotten or ignored: “When those nations who 
may be our principal carriers shall be at war with each other, if we have not within 
ourselves the means of transportation, our products must be exported in belligerent 
vessels at increased expense, or perish on our hands.” (Gibson 2000, p. 103)  In 1914, the 
conditions that Jefferson forewarned against materialized. 
Great Britain, France and Italy immediately diverted much of their shipping to 
supporting their war efforts.  German and Austrian shippers ceased operations.  The 
sudden scarcity of carriers drove up freight rates and the threat posed by German U-boats 
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sent insurance premiums soaring.  Shipping costs on trade routes that crossed war zones 
increased as much as 700 percent. (Zeis 1938, p. 85)   
The rise in world shipping costs and American vulnerability to disruptions in 
overseas shipping wreaked havoc in major sectors of U.S. farming and industry.  U.S. 
exports to Europe virtually ceased and much of the nation’s transportation system and the 
economy it served came to a standstill.  While the U.S. was not yet at war, its economy 
was being cordoned off. 
President Wilson and Treasury Secretary William McAdoo took prompt action in 
an attempt to address the crises by introducing legislation establishing a Bureau of War 
Risk Insurance to underwrite potential losses of American ship owners.  At the same 
time, U.S. neutrality at this point suddenly made sailing under a U.S. flag highly 
attractive.  Ship owners responded swiftly to these changes and over half of the five 
hundred thousand tons of American-owned foreign flagged shipping switched to a U.S. 
flag. (Gibson 2000, p. 105) 
In preparation for entry into the war and against significant opposition from anti-
government businessmen, the Shipping Act of 1916 was passed.  This legislation opened 
an era in which the federal government funded, regulated and dominated the U.S. 
merchant marine.  The Act created a five-man Shipping Board with authority to acquire 
and operate a government fleet.  The significance of this legislation was that for the first 
time, the U.S. had one single authoritative agency to manage maritime issues that was 
also endowed with funds to face the shipping crises of World War I.  
The shipping difficulties of the time were compounded as the U.S. entered the 
war in April 1917.  This change further strained the flailing maritime industry with 
demands to carry and supply U.S. troops overseas.  Under Wilson’s leadership, and with 
enormous resources made available by the nation’s burgeoning industrial economy, the 
U.S. set out on an intensive shipbuilding effort.   
As this tremendous effort began to build momentum, the war came to an 
unexpected and sudden end in November 1918.  In under two years time the Emergency 
Fleet Corporation, a subsidiary of the Shipping Board, had laid the keels of 1,429 vessels 
but had only delivered 470 completed ships. (De La Pedraja 1992, p. 58)             
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A post World War I U.S. government found itself in ownership of a vast merchant 
fleet capable of carrying a substantial share of the country’s ocean borne trade.  The 
Emergency Fleet Corporation’s shipbuilding program was subjected to charges of waste 
and inefficiency for paying outlandishly high prices and for continuing the program long 
after hostilities had ended.  By the end of 1919, most normal shipping markets had 
returned and there was growing pressure to get the government out of the shipping 
business.  A bill, now commonly referred to as the “Jones Act,” sponsored by then 
chairman of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Senator Wesley Jones, sought to build 
a new basis for assuring the continued existence and vitality of the U.S. merchant marine. 
The Jones Act, formally the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, defined the maritime 
goals of the U.S.: “It is hereby declared the policy of the United States to do whatever 
may be necessary to develop and encourage the maintenance of a merchant 
marine…sufficient to carry the greater portion of its commerce and serve as a naval or 
military auxiliary in time of war or national emergency, ultimately to be owned and 
operated privately by citizens of the United States.” (U.S. DOT, MARAD 2001)  The Act 
is best known for strengthening the existing coastal shipping laws and initially attempting 
to include the Philippine Islands in the territories defined as coastal.  Pressure from 
foreign shipping companies, who threatened to boycott Manila, convinced the Shipping 
Board to exclude the Islands, which were then under U.S. control, from cabotage 
protection.      
As the 1920s began, the U.S. attempted to dispose of its nearly 10 million ton 
war-built fleet by offering its ships for sale.  Even at below market prices the U.S. was 
not able to sell off the majority of its ships.  This indirect subsidy made quality ships 
available to American operators at extremely low prices, which resulted in increased U.S. 
presence on the world’s ocean trade routes.   
As overseas rivals began to reappear on ocean trade routes with newer and more 
efficient ships of their own, the higher costs associated with operating U.S. ships began to 
negate the advantage of having a low cost, war-built fleet.  As the war-built fleet aged 
and faced increasing competition from foreign carriers, the Shipping Board became 
desperate to find a way to sustain the U.S. industry.   
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The Merchant Marine Act of 1920 expanded the mail subsidy system.  Contracts 
were to be awarded for the carriage of mails for specific trade routes, with the level of 
funding dependent upon the size and speed of a vessel.  No criteria for determining the 
effect of granting subsidies or “mail contracts” on mail service itself were included in the 
Act.  With few fixed rules attached to the legislation, the Shipping Board used the Mail 
Contract Appropriation as a vehicle to award maximum payments to the shipping lines. 
The funds provided through mail contracts led to the building of some sixty-four 
new ships and the modernization of a number of others.  But the program was wrought 
with gross mismanagement and exorbitant cost.  A final report on the mail subsidy 
system prepared by the Maritime Commission (the successor to the Shipping Board) in 
1937 determined that the Post Office Department had provided steamship companies 
with nearly $200 million under subsidy contracts.  This figure amounted to nearly ten 
times the normal rate for the amount of mail that was actually carried. (U.S. Maritime 
Commission 1937, p. 85) 
C. MERCHANT MARINE ACT OF 1936 
1. Policy Goals 
In 1935, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt forwarded to Congress legislation 
providing outright subsidies as the way to revitalize America’s maritime industry.  
Roosevelt cited three reasons why the U.S. needed an adequate merchant marine.  The 
first addressed American shipping needs in peacetime: “in time of peace, subsidies 
granted by other nations, shipping combines, and other restrictive or rebating methods 
may well be used to the detriment of American shippers.” (Gibson 2000)  The second 
reason focused on American shipping needs in time of war when the U.S. is in a neutral 
position: “in the event of a major war in which the U.S. is not involved, U.S. commerce 
in the absence of an adequate American merchant marine might find itself seriously 
crippled.” (Gibson 2000)  Thirdly, Roosevelt cited U.S. shipping and naval needs in a 
major war in which the U.S. is a participant: “in the event of war in which the U.S. itself 
might be engaged, American-flag ships are obviously needed not only for naval 
auxiliaries, but also for the maintenance of reasonable and necessary intercourse with 
other nations.” (Gibson 2000)     
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The bill that emerged, the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, reflected the New Deal 
determination to restructure ailing industries while directing the government to maintain 
high standards for American seafarers through the use of subsidies aimed at off-setting 
the cost differential between U.S. crewed ships compared to the less expensive crew costs 
on foreign-flag ships. (U.S. DOT MARAD 2001) 
2. Policy Tools 
The Merchant Marine Act of 1936 repeated a key tenant of the 1920 Act in 
calling for a fleet “sufficient to carry a substantial portion of America’s commerce,” 
while leaving the term “substantial” vague and citing no requirement for reaching this 
target. (U.S. DOT MARAD 2001)  Maritime officials interpreted this phrase to mean 
approximately half of all U.S. foreign trade, but achievement of this goal never became 
realistic.  Title 1 of the Act contained a policy statement that closely mirrored the 
preamble of the 1920 Act.  Title 2 of the 1936 Act established a new five member 
Maritime Commission, which replaced the Shipping Board.  Title 3 of the new law 
brought working conditions and minimum wages directly under supervision of the 
government for the first time.  Since crew costs on subsidized ships would obviously be 
higher than those on foreign-flagged ships, the U.S. would pay the differential.  An 
unforeseen consequence of this commitment was that the wage levels set for the 
subsidized ships eventually set the standard for wages in all U.S. shipping companies, 
whether receiving a subsidy or not.  Title 4 terminated all mail contracts effective June 
30, 1937, and transferred the duties given to the Postmaster General by the Merchant 
Marine Act of 1928 to the new Maritime Commission. (U.S. DOT MARAD 2001)   
The heart of the 1936 Act’s new subsidy system was outlined in Titles 5 and 6.  
Two types of subsidies were provided for.  The first of these, the Construction 
Differential Subsidy (CDS), provided payments for newly constructed ships built in U.S. 
yards provided they remained documented under the laws of the United States for at least 
twenty years. 
The ODS was the single most important and highly contested program in 
recognizing and offsetting the higher costs associated with operating ships under a U.S. 
flag.  Operators wishing to participate in this program were required to commit to 
purchase or build the ships needed “to meet competitive conditions” on a particular trade 
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route and to make a specified number of voyages on that route each year. (U.S. DOT 
MARAD 2001)  Operators also had to replace their vessels on a regular basis (which was 
loosely interpreted to mean every twenty years) and all vessels receiving a subsidy were 
required to be less than twenty-five years old.  In addition, the recipient of an ODS 
contract was prohibited from operating foreign registered ships, unless the Secretary of 
Commerce (later the Secretary of Transportation) waived any of these rules after 
determining it was in the public’s best interest to do so. 
Meeting these conditions became part of a contract between the Maritime 
Commission and the operator.  The Commission’s contractual obligation was to subsidize 
“the fair and reasonable cost of insurance, maintenance, repairs not compensated for by 
insurance, wages and subsistence of officers and crews, and any item of expense where 
the applicant is at a substantial disadvantage in competition with vessels of a foreign 
country.” (U.S. DOT MARAD 2001)  This subsidy was to be limited to no more than 75 
percent of such eligible costs.  In return, ship owners had to agree that half of any 
earnings that exceeded 10 percent, when averaged over a five-year period, would be 
turned over to the government.   
Title 7 authorized the Maritime Commission to initiate construction of ships for 
the government’s account if it determined the shipbuilding plans of private operators 
were insufficient.  Once built, these vessels could then be sold or chartered to private 
operators. (U.S. DOT MARAD 2001)  
Title 8 was designed to prevent the exploitation of public funds through the 
implementation of a series of safeguards.  Shipping companies were allowed to establish 
and employ companies to provide ship related services so long as they were wholly 
owned, in which case their profits would appear on the balance sheet of the parent 
company and thus be subject to recapture.  Subsidized companies were also restricted 
from entering into coastal or intercoastal trade.   
The Merchant Marine Act of 1936 has proven to be a legislative landmark in the 
history of U.S. maritime policy.  It was unprecedented in its depth and 
comprehensiveness and many of the policy tools it put into place are still with us today.   
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D. MARITIME POLICY REFORM 
President Nixon’s Merchant Marine Act of 1970 legislated new shipbuilding 
initiatives coupled with a rollback in construction subsidies under Title 5 of the Merchant 
Marine Act of 1936.  Nixon’s position was that the aging American fleet could only be 
replaced by American-built ships through improvements in efficiency and effective cost 
cutting measures.  In addition, the subsidy for maintenance and repair was eliminated, but 
the 50 percent ad valorem tax on repairs completed in foreign shipyards was left intact.  
Although the result was increased cost to operators, the 1970 Act stimulated the largest 
peacetime private shipbuilding program in U.S. history.   
Another significant change brought about by this Act was the elevation of the 
Maritime Administrator to the level of Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Maritime 
Affairs.  This identified the holder of this position as the administration’s chief 
spokesman for maritime policy.  
Passed some twenty-five years after the end of World War II, the Merchant 
Marine Act of 1970 provided short-term invigoration to the U.S. merchant marine 
through the inauguration of new shipbuilding programs.  Between 1970 and 1975 
shipbuilders spent over a billion dollars on capital improvements to their construction 
yards and the cargo-carrying capacity of the privately owned deepdraft U.S. merchant 
fleet reached a record 21.6 million deadweight tons. (Gibson 2000, p. 201)  Two 
subsidized companies, Waterman and Delta, constructed a series of large Lighter Aboard 
Ship (LASH) vessels and several existing ships were enlarged and converted to container 
carriers.   
Yet, in the long-term, remaining restrictive policies, such as the continuing 
requirement that U.S.-flag ships had to be U.S. built, meant that if American shipbuilders 
did not succeed in lowering their costs to competitive world levels, U.S. carriers would 
remain dependent on government subsidies and subject to the accompanying restrictions. 
When Ronald Reagan took office after the election of 1980, the size of the U.S. 
merchant marine engaged in international trade had fallen back to the level it had been at 
prior to World War I.  Carrying less than 5 percent of the nation’s foreign commerce, the 
U.S.-flagged merchant marine fleet had ceased to be a maritime power of any relevance.   
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As a presidential candidate, Reagan put forth an extensive nine-point maritime 
program to rebuild the U.S. merchant marine.  Once elected, however, Reagan did 
nothing to implement the program.  The reported reason was that the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) conducted a review of maritime programs during the 
presidential transition period and concluded: “National security arguments do not provide 
a strong justification for the provision of public assistance to the maritime industries.” 
(Kesteloot 2000, p. 5)  OMB believed that Navy ship construction and private ship 
overhaul and repair work were sufficient to maintain the shipbuilding mobilization base 
determined to be required in a national emergency.  
A product of the Clinton Administration, Congress and private industry, the 
Maritime Security Act of 1996 became the last significant 20th century maritime 
legislation with defense implications.  It was signed by the President as Public Law 104-
239, on October 8, 1996.  In his statement of support for the law, President Clinton 
explained: “The Maritime Security Act will protect American jobs and maintain a U.S. 
presence in international maritime trade, ensuring that vital imports and exports are 
delivered in both peacetime and wartime.  The Act reaffirms our Nation’s resolve to 
maintain a strong U.S.-flag presence on the high seas for our continued national security 
and economic growth.” (Clinton 1996)   
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III. CONDITIONS INFLUENCING POLICY IMPLEMENTATION  
A. INTRODUCTION   
The passage of the MSA represents the fundamental policy decision to amend the 
Merchant Marine Act of 1936 to revitalize the U.S.-flag merchant marine.  The vitality of 
the U.S.-flag merchant marine was the issue being addressed and its revival was the 
objective to be pursued.   
According to Sabatier and Mazmanian’s model, the crucial role of 
implementation analysis is to identify the factors that affect the achievement of statutory 
objectives.  Their model comprises sixteen independent variables from three different 
categories that influence the implementation process, as shown by Figure 1.  There are 
several criteria that the model uses to determine the ability of a statute to favorably 
structure the implementation process and the effect of a variety of nonstatutory variables 
on the balance of support for statutory objectives.  
The model suggests that implementation effectiveness and statutory coherence are 




Figure 1. Flow Diagram of the Variables Involved in the Implementation Process 
(From: Sabatier 1995). 
 
B. ABILITY OF THE MSA TO STRUCTURE IMPLEMENTATION 
1. Clarity of Legislative Objectives 
The first concept underlying this statutory variable is the precision of policy 
objectives.  The more that a statute provides precise and clearly ranked instructions to 
implementing officials, the more likely it is that the policy outputs of the implementing 
agencies, and ultimately the behavior of target groups, will be consistent with those 
directives. (Sabatier 1995, p. 157) 
The objective of the MSA is provided in its opening sentence: “To amend the 
Merchant Marine Act, 1936 to revitalize the United States-flag merchant marine…” 
(Public Law 1996)  While the term “revitalize” is left ambiguous, section 14 of the MSA 
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required the Secretary of Transportation to submit to Congress a report, along with the 
President’s budget submission for fiscal year 1997, setting forth DOT policies for the 5-
year period beginning October 1, 1995, with respect to: 
• fostering and maintaining a United States merchant marine capable of 
meeting economic and national security requirements 
• improving the vitality and competitiveness of the United States merchant 
marine and the maritime industrial base, including ship repairers, 
shipbuilders, ship manning, ship operators, and ship suppliers 
• reversing the precipitous decrease in the number of ships in the United 
States flag fleet and the Nation’s shipyard and repair capability 
• stabilizing and eventually increasing the number of mariners available to 
crew United States merchant vessels 
• achieving adequate manning of merchant vessels for national security 
needs during a mobilization 
• ensuring that sufficient civil maritime resources will be available to meet 
defense deployment and essential economic requirements in support of our 
national security strategy 
• ensuring that the United States maintains the capability to respond 
unilaterally to security threats in geographic areas not covered by alliance 
commitments and otherwise meets sealift requirements in the event of 
crises or war 
• ensuring that international agreements and practices do not place United 
States maritime industries at an unfair competitive disadvantage in world 
markets; 
• ensuring that Federal agencies promote, through effective application of 
laws and regulations, the readiness of the United States merchant marine 
and supporting industries 
• any other relevant maritime policies. (Public Law 104-239) 
Then Secretary of Transportation, Rodney E. Slater, submitted the required report 
to Congress in May 1998. (U.S. DOT MARAD 1998)  Subsequent reporting 
requirements are not delineated in the MSA.   
Closely related to the specificity or precision of statutory objectives is the ranking 
that the new objectives are given within the totality of the implementing agency’s 
programs. (Sabatier 1995, p. 157)  The MSA tasks the DOT with implementation but 
does not rank attainment of its objectives relative to the myriad of programs within the 
Department.  MARAD is DOT’s implementing agency for the MSA.  MARAD’s mission 
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to “foster a safe and environmentally sound maritime transportation system that promotes 
national security and economic growth” and goals of “assuring an intermodal sealift 
capability to support vital national security interests,” “enhancing the competitiveness of 
the U.S. shipyard industry (including repair and related industries),” “improving 
intermodal transportation system performance by applying advanced technology and 
innovation,” and by “increasing the U.S. maritime industry’s participation and foreign 
trade, and cargo and passenger movement in domestic trade” (U.S. DOT MARAD 2002, 
p. 1) are consistent and inherently tied to the “revitalization” objective and reporting 
requirements imposed upon the DOT as cited in the MSA.   
2. Causal Theory 
The causal theory incorporated within the MSA for attaining the statute’s 
objective of “revitalization” is based upon the awarding of direct payments to carriers 
who agree to maintain enrollment and eligibility in the MSP. (Public Law 104-239)  That 
is, the principle causal linkage between government intervention and the attainment of 
the legislative objective is through financial compensation.  The theory is based upon the 
cost differential between maintaining a U.S.-flag versus a foreign registry, and the 
premise that government subsidies can solve the problem of decline in the U.S. merchant 
marine.   
3. Financial Resources Available for Implementation 
A threshold level of funding is necessary for there to be any possibility of 
achieving statutory success. (Sabatier 1995, p. 158)  The MSA authorized for 
appropriation $100 million for fiscal year 1996 and such sums as necessary, not to exceed 
$100 million for each fiscal year thereafter through fiscal year 2005. (Public Law 104-
239)   The Secretary of Transportation was given authority under the Act to enter into 
annually renewable operating agreements with eligible vessel owners as a condition of 
including any vessel in the MSP fleet, subject to the availability of subsequent annual 
appropriations for fiscal years beyond 1996. (Public Law 104-239)  
The MSA provided for payments of $2.3 million for fiscal year 1996 and $2.1 
million for each of the nine fiscal years thereafter in which an agreement is in effect to 
the contractors for each vessel covered by an operating agreement.  Because the MSA did 
not come into effect until FY 1997, the payments of $2.3 million were never awarded and 
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ships with operating agreements were paid at the rate of $2.1 million beginning with the 
first agreements approved in January, 1997. (GAO 1997, p. 74)  This level of funding 
provides for agreements with up to 47 vessels.  The $2.1 million payment is a flat fee 
paid in monthly installments throughout the life of the program and does not make 
provisions for inflation or increases in ship operating costs.   
In 1997, the General Accounting Office (GAO) estimated that annual crew costs 
alone for a commercial ship operating under U.S. registry exceed those for foreign 
registry operation with the next highest crew cost by $2.4 million. (GAO 1997)  Much of 
this disparity stems from the higher standards for health, safety, and employment in the 
higher wages and benefits paid to U.S. seamen as compared to what is paid to their 
foreign counterparts.  (Hearing before U.S. House of Representatives May 25, 1993)  
While the country of registry has jurisdiction over the internal affairs of a ship, once a 
foreign seafarer signs onto a foreign-flag vessel, that seafarer is controlled by the 
maritime labor code of the country of registry.  In many of the flag of convenience 
registries there is little or no interest in enforcing their maritime labor code nor the 
administrative capability of doing so. (Hearing before U.S. House of Representatives July 
20, 1993)  Additional disparities exist between U.S. and many foreign carriers in the 
areas of operating and capital costs, U.S. Coast Guard regulations that exceed 
international standards and thus impose higher costs on U.S.-flag vessels than those 
imposed upon foreign-flag competitors, and a higher tax burden. (Hearing before U.S. 
House of Representatives May 25, 1993)   
The $2.1 million annual MSP subsidy covers 13 percent of the $16.15 million in 
annual costs associated with a typical 4,000 twenty-foot equivalent unit (TEU) U.S.-flag 
containership.  The U.S.-flag cost disadvantage after inclusion of the MSP payment is 11 
percent, or $1.78 million, when compared to a typical equivalent 4,000 TEU foreign-flag 
vessel built with after-tax funds.  This figure escalates to a 25 percent, or $4.0375 
million, cost disadvantage when considering a foreign vessel built with pre-tax funds. 
(Interim Report 1999)  
Given the resources provided and allocation requirements within the MSA there 
exists a deficiency in funding the causal theory. 
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4. Hierarchical Integration Among Implementing Institutions  
The absence of numerous semiautonomous bureaucracies and veto/clearance 
points provides for a centralized approach to the implementation of national policy and is 
conducive to statutory objective attainment. (Sabatier 1995, p. 159)  MARAD, under the 
Department of Transportation, is the sole MSA implementing institution.   
The Secretary of Transportation is required under the MSA to consult with the 
Secretary of Defense and MSP contractors in establishing basic terms under which a 
contractor for a vessel covered under an operating agreement shall make available 
commercial transportation resources and services upon request by the Secretary of 
Defense during time of war, national emergency, or for reasons of national security. 
(Public Law 104-239)   
Under the MSA, MARAD shares responsibility for determining military utility 
with the Department of Defense (DOD).  The Secretary of Transportation may waive 
certain aspects of vessel eligibility requirements for acceptance into the MSP only after 
consultation with the Secretary of Defense in determining that a vessel is militarily useful 
for meeting the sealift needs of the United States with respect to national interest or 
national emergencies. (Public Law 1996)  In considering DOD criteria for military 
usefulness MARAD established the use of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) 
definition of “military useful” in the final rule to define the type of vessel utility that 
would qualify a vessel as being eligible for the MSP. (U.S. DOT, MARAD July 15, 1997 
p. 37734)   
5. Decision Rules of MARAD 
A statute can further aid in the implementation process by stipulating the formal 
decision-rules of the implementing agency. (Sabatier 1995, p. 159)  The MSA is 
conducive to this variable in that vessel enrollment eligibility requirements under the 
MSP are specifically delineated within the statute. (Public Law 104-239)     
The criteria for award of operating agreements are also delineated and prioritized 
within the statute.  Operating agreements are awarded to each person submitting an 
eligible request within a priority that bears approximately the same ratio to the total 
number of vessels in that priority, giving preference to vessels constructed in the United 
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States. (Public Law 104-239)  The maritime industry submitted comments to MARAD 
regarding rounding problems in the prorating process due to the possibility of 
applications of eligible vessels exceeding available slots in the MSP.  In response, 
MARAD noted that according to the MSA, if the number of vessels eligible within a 
priority exceeds the available funding for the priority, the number of awards to each 
person shall be made in “approximately” the same ratio as the number of vessels applied 
for in the priority. (Public Law 104-239)  MARAD interprets this language within the 
MSA as granting MARAD latitude within the process to round awards up or down, as 
needed, to correct rounding problems and adjust awards. (U.S. DOT, MARAD July 15, 
1997, p. 37735) 
In response to congressional inquiries concerning the selection process for the 
MSP, the GAO evaluated whether changing the selection process to permit owners to 
compete, rather than apply for available slots could reduce the MSP program costs.  The 
GAO review focused on (1) the potential impact of qualifying vessels, program costs, and 
existing agreements; and (2) the views of DOT and DOD officials on making such a 
change to the selection process. (GAO 1997) 
The GAO noted that opening up the selection process to competition would not 
increase the pool of qualified applicants or the number of eligible vessels without a 
change in the eligibility and selection criteria.  It was also unable to determine whether 
competitive selection would result in bids lower than the $2.1 million annual MSP 
payments and stipulated that unilateral changes to the program could lead to legal 
challenges by vessel owners with whom the government has contractual agreements.  
Additionally, the GAO noted that neither DOT nor DOD favor changes to the established 
selection process and cited their concern that a competitive selection process would not 
result in lower program costs, could actually result in vessel owners withdrawing from 
the program to operate their vessels under a less costly foreign registry, and that such 
actions could result in a loss of assets needed in a time of national emergency. (U.S. 
DOT, MARAD 1997)  
The specification of MSP eligibility requirements through legislation allows 
MARAD to make determinations that are consistent with the statutory objectives with 
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respect to military usefulness.  The proration of awarding agreements is left solely to the 
discretion of MARAD when the number of vessels eligible within a priority exceeds the 
funding available for the priority.  While an argument can be made that MARAD’s 
discretionary authority in the area of prorating awards provides an avenue for potential 
abuse and subsequent litigation, no such claim or filing is on record.  
6. Commitment of Implementing Official and Agency 
No matter how well a statute structures the formal decision process, the 
attainment of its objectives is unlikely unless officials in the managing organizations are 
strongly committed to the attainment of those objectives.  Assigning the responsibility for 
statutory implementation to an agency whose policy orientation is consistent with the 
statute, that will accord the new program a high priority, and that perceives the new 
mandate to be compatible with its traditional orientation are favorable mechanisms 
available to statutory framers in assuring that implementing officials have requisite 
commitment to statutory objectives. (Sabatier 1995, p. 160)  
As an agency of DOT, MARAD has primary responsibility for ensuring the 
availability of efficient water transportation services to shippers and customers.  It also 
seeks to ensure that the United States enjoys adequate shipbuilding and repair service, 
efficient ports, effective intermodal water and land transportation connections, and 
sufficient intermodal shipping capacity for use by DOD in time of national emergency. 
(U.S. DOT, MARAD February 11, 2002, p. 2) 
Both the Secretary of Transportation and the Maritime Administrator are 
appointed positions requiring congressional confirmation.  At the time of the passage of 
the MSA, then Transportation Secretary Rodney Slater had made national security one of 
his five strategic goals for DOT.  Maritime Administrator Clyde J. Hart stated to the 
Oversight Panel on the Merchant Marine of the House Armed Services Committee that 
“MARAD recognizes the importance of sealift readiness and a strong U.S.-flag fleet 
embodied in the MSP.” (U.S. DOT, MARAD March 16, 1999)   
As part of the Bush Administration’s policy to consolidate the management of 
like programs and achieve greater efficiencies, the President’s 2002 budget submission 
proposed the transfer of MSP management and funding from MARAD to DOD. (U.S. 
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DOT, MARAD July 13, 2001)  The House Armed Services Committee cited insufficient 
justification for transferring a program that by all accounts is currently being managed 
effectively.  In addition, the committee noted a lack of evidence that such a transfer 
would result in any cost savings.  Therefore, the committee transferred the $98.7 million 
in MSP funding from the National Defense Sealift Fund back to MARAD. (Report of the 
Armed Services Committee September 2001)  
Current Transportation Secretary Norman Y. Mineta has referred to the U.S. 
marine transportation system as one of America’s most important assets. (U.S. DOT 
October 2001)  On November 30, 2001 the U.S. Senate unanimously confirmed current 
Maritime Administrator Captain William G. Schubert. (U.S. DOT, MARAD November 
30, 2001)  Captain Schubert has publicly acknowledged his support and efforts to build 
consensus on the reauthorization of the MSP. (American 2002)     
7. Formal Access by Outsiders 
Not only can a policy structure the implementation process through the design 
characteristics of implementing organizations, it can also affect the participation of the 
potential beneficiaries and target groups of the program. (Sabatier 1995, p. 160)  The 
target groups of the MSA are the vessel owners.  The beneficiaries are both the owners 
and maritime labor unions.  Neither of these groups have problems with legal standing 
nor do they lack the financial resources or incentives to pursue their case in court if their 
position is at odds with agency decisions.     
C. NONSTATUTORY VARIABLES AFFECTING IMPLEMENTATION 
1. Socioeconomic Conditions 
Variations over time and among governmental jurisdictions in social and 
economic conditions can substantially affect the political support for statutory objectives 
and policy outputs of implementing agencies and eventually the achievement of statutory 
objectives. (Sabatier 1995, p. 162)   
These variations in socioeconomic conditions can affect perceptions of the 
relative importance of the problem addressed by a statute when other social problems 
become relatively more important over time, thus threatening to diminish political 
support for the allocation of scarce resources to the original statute. 
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If socioeconomic factors are relevant to the MSA they are apt to have only a 
minor impact on the ability to achieve success of the statutory objectives of the MSA.  As 
the economy has slowed down, pressure is exerted on the allocation of scarce resources.  
One form of that pressure is likely to take the form of support for programs that are 
beneficial towards labor, including wage subsidies.  
2. The Amount and Continuity of Media Attention  
The mass media can be a crucial intervening variable between changes in 
socioeconomic conditions and the perceptions of those changes by both the general 
public and political elites. (Sabatier 1995, p. 163)  The general tendency of the media is 
to focus on a topic for a short period of time and then move on to other newsworthy 
issues.   
President Clinton signed the MSA with little formality.  A press release 
accompanied the signing, citing his Administration’s commitment to a strong U.S. 
merchant marine. (Clinton 1996)  Since then, media coverage outside of industry 
publications has been sparse.  While recent terrorist events have brought transportation 
assets and intermodalism to the attention of the general media, no significant relationship 
appears to exist between the extent or continuity of media coverage and implementation 
of the MSA.  It may be the case that MSA proponents can use the increased media 
attention to strengthen their position, based on the assumption that a U.S.-flag implies 
heightened security.   
3. Variations over Time in Public Support for Statutory Objectives 
Interest among the general public in a statute or the problem it addresses tends to 
be cyclical.  This can interfere with achieving sustained political support.  Public opinion 
can influence the implementation process by affecting the political agenda and legislative 
issues that are addressed by lawmakers. (Sabatier 1995, p. 164) 
The MSA affects narrow interests, primarily vessel owners and the maritime 
industry labor force.  These interests are centralized in major coastal shipping ports, 
implying severe limits on the ability of these interests to generate and sustain support 
from the general public.  
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4. Changes in Attitudes and Resources of Constituency Groups 
A dilemma confronting the proponents of a regulatory program is that public 
support for their program will tend to decline over time. (Sabatier 1995, p. 164)  Statutes 
are often passed at the height of public concern with an issue.  This concern wanes as the 
media and public turn their focus to other matters.   
Constituency groups that are proponents of the MSA include the vessel owners 
and maritime labor unions.  Such groups can intervene in the actions of the implementing 
agency by commenting on proposed decisions and through appeals to its legislative and 
executive sovereigns.  The relationship between constituency group support and 
implementation success produces a reasonably strong fit with respect to the MSA. 
5. Support from Sovereigns 
The sovereigns of an implementing agency are those institutions which control its 
legal and financial resources.  These include the legislature and its policy and fiscal 
committees, the chief executive, and the court system.  Sovereigns can affect the policies 
pursued by an implementing agency through both informal oversight and formal changes 
in the agency’s legal and financial resources.  When an intergovernmental subordinate is 
faced with conflicting directives from its intergovernmental superiors and its coordinate 
sovereigns, it will ultimately lean toward the direction of the entity that has the greatest 
affect on its legal and financial resources over the longest period of time. (Sabatier 1995, 
p. 165) 
DOT is a hierarchically superior agency in relation to MARAD.  However, the 
most critical sovereign with respect to MARAD and its role as the implementing agency 
of the MSA is the legislative branch and its relevant committees.  These committees 
include the Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee of the U.S. Senate and the 
Oversight Panel on the Merchant Marine of the Armed Services Committee of the U.S. 
House of Representatives.  On the national level, operating agreements under the MSA 
are effective for only one fiscal year, but are renewable, subsequent to the availability of 
appropriations, for each subsequent year through fiscal year 2005. (Public Law 104-239)  
The requirement for an annual appropriation before Congress each year provides the 
program visibility while maintaining the oversight of the legislative sovereigns.  And 
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while DOT is a hierarchically superior agency, the legislative branch maintains the power 
of the purse over MARAD with respect to the MSA. 
6. Commitment and Leadership Skill of Implementing Official 
This variable is affected by the direction and ranking of the statutory objectives in 
the implementing official’s preference ordering and their skill in realizing those 
preferences through their ability to go beyond what could reasonably be expected in 
using available resources.  Skill in using available resources falls under the umbrella of 
an implementing official’s leadership and comprises both political and managerial 
elements. (Sabatier 1995)  Inherent in this concept is the official’s ability to develop 
effective working relationships with the sovereigns having the greatest affect and control 
over the relevant legal and financial resources and to skillfully present the agency’s case 
to the media. 
The current maritime administrator, William G. Schubert, and his predecessor, 
Clyde J. Hart Jr., have publicly commented on their support and commitment towards the 
MSA and its objectives.  But commitment to statutory objectives contributes little to their 
attainment unless accompanied by skill in using available resources to that end.  This 
embodiment of leadership comprises both a political and a managerial element yet 
remains a rather elusive concept.  While its importance is inherent, it is extremely 
difficult to predict whether specific individuals will go beyond what is reasonably 
expected in using available resources in support of statutory objectives. (Sabatier 1999) 
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IV. TRACTIBILITY AND IMPLEMENTATION STAGES 
A. TRACTABILITY 
Inherent tractability refers to the solvability of the problem being addressed.  
Tractability is evaluated by assessing the difficulty in handling and measuring change, 
the diversity of the prescribed behavior, the percentage of the total population that the 
target group represents, and the extent of change required.  These variables suggest that 
problems are most tractable if measurement of change in the seriousness of the problem 
is feasible and there is minimal variation in the behavioral practices that cause the 
problem.  Additional aspects conducive to tractability are ease in identifying the target 
group and modest amounts of required behavioral change. (Sabatier 1995)   
1. Measuring Change 
The MSA required DOT, hence MARAD, to submit to Congress a Maritime 
Policy Report along with the President’s budget submission for fiscal year 1997.  This 
report was to set forth MARAD’s policies for a 5-year period beginning October 1, 1995, 
with respect to ten specifically delineated items commensurate with the MSA objective of 
revitalization of the U.S. merchant marine. (Public Law 104-239)  MARAD adopted 
these items and incorporated them into specific maritime programs to attempt to satisfy 
the requirements set forth in the MSA.  MARAD submitted this five-year plan (A Report 
to Congress on Maritime Policy) in May 1998. (U.S. DOT, MARAD 1998)  The MSA 
did not stipulate further reporting requirements.   
Inherent difficulty arises when measuring change with respect to these policies.  
For example, how does one measure a goal like “ensuring that international agreements 
and practices do not place United States maritime industries at an unfair competitive 
disadvantage in world markets?” (Public Law 104-239)  Overly broad goals hinder the 
ability of measuring and monitoring progress towards their attainment. (Sabatier 1995) 
Section 208 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, as amended, requires the 
Maritime Administrator to submit a report to Congress by April 1 of each year.  This 
report is to include the results of its investigations, a summary of its transactions, its 
recommendations for legislation, a statement of all receipts, and purposes for all 
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expenditures of the prior fiscal year. (U.S. DOT, MARAD 2001)  MARAD’s fiscal year 
1997, 1998, and 1999 reports were submitted to Congress in May of each subsequent 
year respectively.  MARAD’s fiscal year 2000 report is dated July 2001 and was released 
in November 2001. (U.S. DOT MARAD November 26, 2001)   
MARAD has included specifics on its programs and activities in these reports to 
Congress.  Information required by law includes data on the acquisition of obsolete 
vessels, war risk insurance activities, scrapping or removal of obsolete vessels owned by 
the U.S., and U.S.-flag carriage of Government-sponsored cargoes.  MARAD attempts to 
incorporate within these reports the ten goals delineated within the MSA in support of its 
objective of revitalization of the U.S. merchant marine.   
However, attempting to measure what specifically constitutes attainment of these 
goals through the use of metrics is inherently problematic and is not delineated within the 
MSA itself.  MARAD does not, nor is it specifically required to, quantitatively measure 
movement towards attainment of these goals in its annual reports to Congress.     
2. Diversity of Target-Group Behavior 
The more diverse the behavior being regulated, the more difficult it becomes to 
frame clear regulations and thus the less likely that statutory objectives will be attained. 
(Sabatier 1995)  Within the MSA, the target group behavior being regulated is narrow 
and focused.  The conduct at issue is the selection of flags for ship registration on the part 
of the ships’ owners.   
3. Target Group as a Percentage of the Population 
The smaller, more definable, and isolatable the target group whose behavior needs 
to be changed, the more likely that political support can be mobilized in favor of a 
program.  There is minimal variation in this variable since the commercial vessel owners 
are the MSA’s primary target group.  The maritime labor unions are a secondary target 
group.  Having such a narrow band of target groups is conducive to enhancing the 
probability of statutory objective attainment. (Sabatier 1995)  
4. Extent of Behavioral Change Required of Target Groups 
The greater the amount of behavioral change required of target groups the more 
problematic becomes successful implementation.  The change sought under the MSA is 
to revitalize the U.S. merchant marine through targeting vessel owners to halt the trend of 
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converting U.S.-flag vessels to foreign registries.  Having such a modest amount of 
required behavioral change is supportive of successful implementation. (Sabatier 1995) 
The extent to which statutory objectives have been or can be achieved is less than 
clear given the constraints in quantifying the component variable of handling change.  
And while the other components that comprise tractability are more tenable, there is no 
indication as to what constitutes either the minimum acceptable or the upper limit of 
possible success in terms of revitalizing the U.S.-flag merchant marine.  
B. STAGES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS 
Analysis to this point has focused on the independent variables and generic 
factors affecting the implementation process.  Sabatier and Mazmanian’s model next 
provides for viewing that process in terms of dependent variables.  These variable end 
points analyze the extent to which actual impacts conform to statutory objectives 
considering the political system’s summary evaluation of a statute.   
1. Policy Outputs of Implementing Agencies 
Statutory objectives must be translated into regulations, operating procedures, 
specific policy decisions, and their subsequent enforcement.  This process can be 
problematic where a statute involves several implementing agencies with varying degrees 
of commitment to the achievement of statutory objectives.  Breakdowns in coordination 
and communication are often the result. (Sabatier 1995) 
As the sole implementer of the MSA, MARAD is in an ideal position to 
implement its policies to achieve statutory objectives.  The centerpiece of the MSA is the 
MSP.  By providing subsidies to a specific number of vessels, the MSP also attempts to 
address the need for sufficient numbers of U.S. merchant mariners to crew U.S. vessels in 
the event of a contingency.  Each year, MSP participants must enter into or renew an 
“emergency preparedness agreement” with MARAD, providing government access to the 
capacity of those vessels if required. 
Soon after the passage of the MSA, the Secretary of Defense announced the 
creation of the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA), a joint program of the 
Departments of Defense and of Transportation.  VISA provides the “emergency 
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preparedness agreement” contemplated by the MSA for activating MSP vessels in 
support of military sealift needs. (Public Law 104-239) 
There are two categories of carriers participating in VISA: those who receive 
payments through the MSP (and must enroll in VISA) and those who do not.  MSP 
participants in VISA must commit 100 percent of the capacity of enrolled vessels, while 
carriers who are not in the MSP may commit only a portion of their capacity.  In both 
cases, the vessel operator is also required to commit a proportionate amount of other 
transportation resources, such as cargo handling equipment, terminal facilities, and rail 
cars.   
A noteworthy feature of the MSP is that while the program subsidizes ships, 
vessel operators must make capacity available to the government in time of war, national 
emergency, or whenever the Secretary of Defense determines it necessary for national 
security. (U.S. DOT, MARAD 1998)  If a particular ship is not available, the ship 
operator can substitute an equivalent U.S. or foreign-flag vessel.  Substitute vessels can 
be from the participating carrier or from another with which the participating carrier has 
an agreement.  While the MSP is designed around assured access to a core of U.S.-flag 
vessels, the program provides a framework in which U.S. military sealift requirements 
may be met by the mobilization of foreign-flag ships. (Public Law 104-239)  
The composition of current vessels and owners representing the MSP is displayed 
in Table 1. 
Behavioral compliance can be described as an assessment of the relative costs and 
benefits of following legal objectives.  The decision to comply is a function of the 
probability that noncompliance will be detected and successfully prosecuted, the 









American Ship Management, LLC 9 containerships 
Automar International Car Carrier, Inc. 3 roll-on/roll-off vessels 
Central Gulf Lines, Inc. 3 roll-on/roll-off vessels 
E-Ships, Inc. 3 containerships 
First American Bulk Carrier Corp. 2 containerships 
First Ocean Bulk Carrier-I, II, III, LLC 3 containerships 
Maersk Line, Limited 4 containerships 
OSG Car Carriers, Inc. 1 roll-on/roll-off vessel 
U.S. Ship Management, Inc. 15 containerships 
Waterman Steamship Corporation 3 LASH vessels 
1 roll-on/roll-off vessel 
Total:  47 vessels 
 
Table 1.   MSP Participants. 
(http://www.marad.dot.gov/programs/MSP/msp_participants.htm, February 13, 2002) 
 
2. Target Group Compliance with Policy Outputs 
In the context of this policy analysis, complying with MSP membership 
requirements is specified within the MSA.  Any mobilization under VISA would 
necessarily occur only after the commercial charter market for U.S. and foreign-flag 
vessels had been exhausted. (Public Law 101-239)  To date, the Secretary of Defense has 
never activated such a mobilization.  It is unclear what remedies would be available to 
MARAD in the event of such an activation where a MSP carrier did not provide 
commensurate activated vessel capacity.  One could speculate that such liability or 





3. Actual Impacts of Policy Outputs 
The major concern is the conformity of the impacts of the MSP to the statutory 
objectives of the MSA.  The MSP is intended to ensure that an active U.S.-flag merchant 
fleet of sufficient size and composition, along with the appropriate labor force, remains in 
place to provide sealift in support of national security objectives.  However, the program 
does not represent a comprehensive solution to the long, steady decline of both the U.S.-
flag fleet and the number of American merchant mariners.   
In 1955, the U.S. oceangoing fleet numbered 1,072 ships. (Kesteloot 1999)  By 
1996, the oceangoing segment of the privately owned fleet engaged in international trade 
comprised 281 active ships. (U.S. DOT MARAD May 1997)  In 1999, MARAD 
introduced a new format for the presentation of U.S.-flag fleet statistics to include non 
self-propelled vessels.  This change not withstanding, in 2001 MARAD reported only 
147 self-propelled U.S.-flag vessels operating in international trade, of which 47 were 
receiving MSP funding. (U.S. DOT MARAD July 2001)   
To a certain extent, the decline in the number of ships has been mitigated by the 
increasing average size and productivity of each vessel.  In 1995, 35 percent of all 
containerships calling at U.S. ports exceeded 4000 TEUs in size.  By the year 2010, 60 
percent are expected to exceed this size.  The largest containerships afloat now exceed 
6000 TEUs.  With an increase in the average vessel size has come significant 
consolidation of the worldwide shipping industry due to the magnitude of investments for 
large, efficient vessels.  (Library of Congress 1998) 
It is also important to note that 36 of the 47 MSP participant vessels are 
containerships, considered to be the most useful type of vessel for resupply of the 
military in the event of war or other national security operation.  An additional eight 
vessels provide roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) capability, primarily useful for moving Army 
and Marine Corps vehicles. 
An additional impact of the MSP has been reduced outlays for the U.S. 
government as compared with the ODS.  The ODS was in effect from 1936 until replaced 
by the MSP in 1996.  The final ODS agreement expired in September 2001.  Under ODS, 
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vessel operators were enrolled in the Sealift Readiness Program (SRP) and committed 
only the vessel, without crews or terminal facilities.  Ships were never activated under the 
SRP, allowing the government to avoid having to determine how to operate these vessels 
under such conditions. 
Expected outlays for the MSP are capped at $100 million per year through fiscal 
year 2005.  In contrast, ODS payments for 1996, the last full year for that program, were 
$164.7 million. (U.S. DOT MARAD May 1997)  The less costly MSP ensures that crews, 
terminal equipment, and intermodal facilities, in addition to ships, will also be available.  
The MSP also removed the ODS requirement of having ships serve specific transit lanes 
at minimum service levels in order to qualify to receive subsidies.  This restriction 
impeded the ability of ship operators to respond to changing market conditions. (Library 
of Congress 1998) 
The MSP addresses the issue of sustaining sufficient numbers of U.S. citizen 
merchant mariners to man U.S. vessels in the event of a contingency by providing 
subsidies to a specific number of vessels.  The slow decline in the number of U.S. 
merchant mariners has continued.  Average monthly U.S. seafaring employment 
decreased from 11,205 in fiscal year 1996 (U.S. DOT MARAD May 1997) to 10,458 in 
fiscal year 1999, a drop of 6.7 percent. (U.S. DOT MARAD 2000)  This figure was not 
reported in MARAD’s fiscal year 2000 annual report to Congress.  
Of note is that the average monthly U.S. seafaring employment figure for fiscal 
year 1999 showed a 1.3 percent increase from fiscal year 1998. (U.S. DOT MARAD 
2000)  Also, technological improvements in vessels are reducing average crew size, as 
has been the case onboard trains and aircraft. 
4. Perceived Impacts of Policy Outputs 
Consolidations within the global shipping industry since the passage of the MSA 
have raised concerns about the statute’s effectiveness as a means of ensuring the viability 
of a U.S.-flag merchant marine.  During 1997, Neptune Orient Lines (NOL), a Singapore 
based shipping firm, purchased American President Lines (APL).  At the time, APL had 
nine vessels enrolled in the MSP.  Prior to the announcement of its sale, MARAD agreed 
to allow APL to transfer its subsidy contracts if certain conditions were met.  APL 
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announced it intended to transfer these ships to trusts that would register the ships under 
the U.S.-flag.  The trusts would provide charters to the newly formed American Ship 
Management Company (ASM), which would manage the ships and collect the subsidies. 
(Gibson 2000) 
That same year, Lykes Lines, which was in bankruptcy, was sold, along with its 
three MSP vessels, to CP Ships, the maritime division of Canadian Pacific Limited.  In 
1999, Crowley American Transport sold its three container-RO/RO ships to Automar 
International Car Carriers (AICC).  The formation of American Automar, Inc., a U.S. 
subsidiary of AICC, enabled these vessels to continue to receive an MSP subsidy. (U.S. 
DOT MARAD September 21, 1999)  This took Crowley, one of the largest U.S.-flag 
shipping firms, entirely out of the MSP.   
Also in 1999, Sea-Land, the largest U.S. shipping firm with 15 containerships 
enrolled in the MSP, was sold to Maersk Line of Denmark.  Once more, Maersk’s newly 
formed U.S. subsidiary, U.S. Ship Management, Inc. (USSM) was allowed to time 
charter the vessels to Maersk. (U.S. DOT MARAD December 9, 1999)   
Finally, in 2000, P & O Nedlloyd Limited (PONL), a corporation organized in the 
United Kingdom, acquired Farrel Lines Inc.  Farrel’s three MSP operating agreements 
were transferred to E Ships, Inc., a new U.S. subsidiary of PONL. (U.S. DOT MARAD 
July 2001) 
These arrangements have allowed MSP enrolled vessels to continue to receive 
subsidies by maintaining a U.S.-flag and by classifying the newly formed subsidiaries as 
“documentation U.S. citizens.” (U.S. DOT MARAD September 27, 1999)  The resulting 
perceived impact of this policy output is that MARAD, in effect, is subsidizing foreign 
shipping firms to maintain U.S.-flag vessels. 
National security objectives have consistently been a significant component of 
merchant marine legislation.  Current U.S. maritime policy as a means of ensuring 
adequate national defense sealift capability has not evolved to match the advent of an 
increasingly global maritime shipping industry.  This policy is built upon the premise that 
non-U.S.-flag ships, crewed by foreign nationals, are not a reliable means of sealift for 
military requirements.   
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This premise was challenged during Operation Desert Shield/Storm where the 
Military Sealift Command (MSC) shipped 15 million tons of cargo in support of the 
largest military effort conducted by the United States since the Vietnam War.  By the 
opening of the ground war in January 1991, MSC had chartered 21 U.S.-flag ships and 
162 foreign-flag vessels to supplement 106 ships under its own control. (Lovett 1996)  
The defense rational for some form of support for the U.S. merchant marine has 
historically carried great rhetorical weight.  However, while military requirements clearly 
necessitate the deployment of personnel, equipment, and supplies, the need for these 
movements to be made on protected and subsidized U.S.-flag merchant vessels is far less 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
35 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY  
The Sabatier-Mazmanian framework provides a useful structure for the 
examination of different kinds of policies and programs, linking objectives to issues 
affecting implementation.  The findings of this analysis support the statutory coherence 
hypothesis and reinforce the importance of policy formulation to all stages of the policy 
process.  
B. RESEARCH FINDINGS  
Recognizing that many factors affect implementation, policymakers have a 
substantial capacity to influence policy outputs.  While each aspect is a separate variable 
under the Sabatier-Mazmanian model, these aspects can be aggregated.  For a number of 
the critical variables there exists a relationship between statutory coherence and 
implementation success.  Ideally it would be feasible to quantify the independent 
variables and level of implementation success in such a way that the relative influence of 
each could be determined.  This determination would prove to be most valuable for 
policymakers.   
1. Critical Factors 
In this analysis, the clarity in framing of objectives, the tractability in handling 
and measuring change, the causal theory being incorporated, and financial resources 
available are especially important.   
The most essential requirement is that there be clear and definable objectives 
against which to measure policy success.  As previously discussed, the objective of the 
MSA is to “amend the Merchant Marine Act, 1936 to revitalize the United States-flag 
merchant marine.”  (Public Law 104-239)  While not defining the term “revitalize,” 
section 14 of the MSA ties this objective to ten delineated items commensurate with the 
notion of revitalization and setting forth MARAD policies.  Inherent difficulty arises 
when measuring change with respect to these policies and their overly broad goals.  In the 
absence of tractability, measurement as to what specifically constitutes attainment of 
statutory success with respect to these policies is intrinsically problematic.   
36 
Also crucial is the validity of the causal theory incorporated into the statute.  The 
causal theory incorporated within the MSA for attaining the statute’s objective of 
“revitalization” is based upon the awarding of direct payments to carriers who agree to 
maintain enrollment and eligibility in the MSP. (Public Law 104-239)  That is, the 
principle causal linkage between government intervention and the attainment of the 
legislative objective is through the provision of monetary subsidies.  While this is a valid 
theory, the funding levels it would require are much greater than those provided for in the 
statute. 
2. Impact 
Sealift has historically been a critical part of U.S. national security requirements.  
Its role in future conflicts is less certain.  Nonetheless, U.S. maritime policy is predicated 
on maintaining a viable U.S.-flag merchant marine fleet capable of providing reliable and 
sufficient sealift for the U.S. military in the event of war or other major military 
contingency.  The design of the MSP (though not its stated purpose) and recent use of 
foreign-flag vessels by the Military Sealift Command for military purposes suggest a 
qualified but necessary retreat from the assumptions associated with the size of the U.S.-
flag fleet.  Current legislation authorizes payments that will keep a few ships engaged in 
foreign commerce operating under a U.S.-flag but will not support a fleet significantly 
larger than the current inventory. 
The MSA is a short-term policy that has not revitalized the U.S.-flag merchant 
marine.  However, it has provided a useful mechanism for activation of vessels and 
access to associated intermodal capabilities and infrastructures by the government under 
certain circumstances.  Additionally, the MSA has reduced the annual expenditures 
incurred under its predecessor program, the ODS, in order to maintain a core fleet of 
U.S.-flag commercial vessels, while gaining the government access to a skilled and active 
mariner employment base. 
Consolidations within the global shipping industry are likely to continue.  The 
impact on the U.S. from continued globalization in the maritime industry comes not so 
much from the extent of dependence on it but rather from the concentration of 
dependence on a few providers. 
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C. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
1. The continuing decline in the size of the U.S. commercial fleet and 
recent consolidations within the global shipping industry confirm the 
need for a thorough review of U.S. maritime policy.   
Such a review should explicitly consider the evolutionary global nature of the 
maritime shipping industry and how the U.S. can most effectively leverage its access to 
sealift capabilities through its maritime policy to meet national defense requirements.   
2. Expanding the causal theory to bridge the funding gap between what 
is provided for under current MSA subsidies and the operating and 
capital costs of maintaining a significantly larger U.S. registry 
warrants consideration.   
These cost drivers include: 
• U.S. Coast Guard regulations that exceed international standards 
and thus impose higher costs on U.S.-flag vessels than those 
imposed upon foreign-flag competitors 
• The requirement that ships engaged in U.S. cabotage trade be 
domestically built 
• Customs duties levied on non-emergent foreign repairs to U.S.-flag 
ships 
• Taxing the earnings of U.S.-flag ships engaged in international 
trade commensurate with those of a domestic operation 
• Taxing crew wages on voyages in foreign commerce 
• Crew sizing requirements that exceed those of foreign-flag 
competitors 
Most vessels operating under a foreign-flag engaged in international maritime 
trade either pay no taxes or have the ability to defer income tax payments by setting funds 
aside for pending vessel modernization or new construction.  It is also common practice 
in many countries to exempt part or all of a crewmember’s wages from taxation.  
Historical U.S. policy has been to compensate for this competitive disadvantage by 
subsidizing wages and limiting competition for U.S. cargoes.  
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3. Evaluate the incorporation of second or open registries. 
Other traditional maritime nations, such as Norway, have adopted the notion of 
second or open registries.  This has allowed vessels to be registered with fewer 
restrictions and a reduced associated tax burden when compared to that nation’s standard 
registration process.  These types of registries represent a compromise between 
traditional flagging practices and flags of convenience. 
4. Maritime policy needs to evolve to match the advent of an 
increasingly global shipping industry.   
The predisposed and historic assumption of a link between U.S. national security 
and a large U.S.-flag merchant marine fleet warrants reassessment given the fact that the 
few remaining successful U.S. shipping firms are members of large consortia.   
Current U.S. maritime policy represents the continuation of a “bandage” solution 
to the hemorrhaging of U.S.-flag vessels to more profitable foreign registries and is in 
need of a new approach.  The accepted practices of the international maritime market 
must be acknowledged and taken into account. 
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